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The relationship between jurisdiction and territory has long been a
contested one. As the modem State gradually replaced the Holy Roman
Empire to become the dominant form of political organization in West-
em Europe, questions about the limits and divisibility of power began to
be framed as questions about the relationship between jurisdiction and
territory. The emergence of the territorial State during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries posed a challenge to the universal jurisdiction of
both the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor within Europe. Both the
Pope and the Emperor claimed the right to exercise jurisdiction over the
world as a matter of right, even if they had no control over particular
territories as a matter of empirical fact. The relationship between juris-
diction and territory was not only an issue within Europe. During the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, debates about the authority of Euro-
pean sovereigns to rule newly discovered territories in the New World
also began to be articulated in terms of the relation between jurisdiction
and control over territory. Disputes amongst European powers about
which Christian monarchs could claim rights of dominium over territory
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in the New World turned on whether the Pope had the authority and ju-
risdiction to grant such rights.'
The eventual triumph of the territorial State as the dominant political
form globally meant that jurisdiction and territory came to be understood
as closely related terms. Richard Ford, for example, argues that modern
jurisdiction is always "defined by area."2 While in theory an entity could
be defined in terms of genre (for example, as an entity with "authority
over 'all oil, wherever it is found"'), that entity "would not be a jurisdic-
tion but an authority of another kind. A jurisdiction is territorially
defined. 3 Yet if we look to the history of the debate over the right of ex-
ternal actors to determine the legitimacy of control over territory, we can
see that the relation between jurisdiction and territory has never been
finally determined. That debate stretches across six hundred years, from
fifteenth century arguments about the extent of papal or imperial juris-
diction to decide who has authority over territories in Europe or the New
World, through to contemporary debates about whether the international
community has jurisdiction to intervene in situations where States are
ruled by tyrants or by governments that are unable or unwilling to pro-
tect the population.
This Essay focuses upon one contemporary manifestation of that on-
going battle over the relationship between jurisdiction and control over
territory-the emergence and institutionalization of the "responsibility to
protect" concept. The idea that States and the international community
have a responsibility to protect populations has shaped internationalist
debates about conflict prevention, the use of force, and international ad-
ministration since its development by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 . The responsibility
to protect concept is premised on the notion, to quote former Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, that "the primary raison d'8tre and duty" of every
State is to protect its population.' If a State proves unable to protect its
1. See, e.g., FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS 84-92 (Anthony Pagden &
Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991); RICHARD HAKLUYT, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING WESTERN
PLANTING, WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1584, at 129-51 (Charles Deane ed., 1877); see also KEN
MACMILLAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION IN THE ENGLISH NEW WORLD: THE LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE, 1576-1640, at 64-74 (2006) (discussing the English response to
papal claims of authority and jurisdiction to distribute lands in the New World).
2. Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843,
852 (1999).
3. Id.
4. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT 16 (2001), available at http://www.iciss.calpdf/Commission-Report.pdf (last
visited June 6, 2009).
5. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, 135, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar.
21, 2005).
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citizens, the responsibility to do so shifts to the international community.
The concept was endorsed by the General Assembly in its World Summit
Outcome, and has since garnered the support of States, international or-
ganizations and civil society, and informed major projects of institutional
transformation at the United Nations.
Part I of the Essay sets the scene by situating the responsibility to
protect concept within the longstanding debate about the relationship
between jurisdiction and territory. The competition for authority between
States and the Holy Roman Empire, both within and beyond Europe, has
involved debates over the meaning of jurisdiction, imperium, territory,
and possession. Those questions were not resolved with the demise of
the Holy Roman Empire and the emergence of the modern State in
Europe, but have continued to play out in battles over the proper relation
between state jurisdiction and international jurisdiction. Part II outlines
the ways in which the relation between state (or domestic) jurisdiction
and international jurisdiction was defined in the Charter of the United
Nations (U.N.), and traces the growing importance of the claim that au-
thority must be constrained in particular ways in order to be legitimate in
the post-United Nations era. I argue there that the drive for humanitarian
action to defend the rights of individuals quickly undermined any tidy
settlement of these jurisdictional questions. The jurisdiction of the
United Nations to shape the way in which States are governed has long
been a source of contest, as has the jurisdiction of the Security Council
to police the common interest. Debates about the limits of international
authority have intensified since 1989 with the growth of support for the
concepts of humanitarian intervention and, more recently, the responsi-
bility to protect. Part III examines the way in which the scope and limits
of the international responsibility to protect have been expressed in ju-
risdictional terms. In the lead up to the 2005 World Summit, many
States, particularly from the global South, were very concerned at the
potential expansion of international authority that might follow from any
official endorsement of the responsibility to protect concept. As a result,
States looked to jurisdiction as a means of limiting the situations in
which an international responsibility to protect might arise. Yet while
legal determinations of jurisdiction are often thought to be about the de-
limitation of authority, they are also very productive sites for generating
a sense of what is possible on either side of the limit.6 It is through the
institutional practices of jurisdiction that authority is made intelligible.
6. For the argument that discourses concerned with boundaries or limits have this
productive quality, see R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS PO-
LITICAL THEORY (1993); Leslie J. Moran, Placing Jurisdiction, in JURISPRUDENCE OF
JURISDICTION 159 (Shaun McVeigh ed., 2007).
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This Part shows that the legal articulation of the triggers to international
jurisdiction produced new representations of the nature and extent of
both state and international authority. Part IV concludes by drawing out
some of the key implications that emerge from the jurisdictional practice
related to the implementation of the responsibility to protect concept.
I. TERRITORY AND JURISDICTION IN THE MODERN WORLD
A. Universal Jurisdiction and the Holy Roman Empire
How does jurisdiction ("the power of stating what is lawful"7) relate
to control over territory? Is control over territory the source or the effect
of jurisdiction? Such questions were of great importance in medieval and
early modern Europe. The answers to these questions turned, among
other things, on the relationship between fact and right. The debate, as
with many debates over authority in Europe during that time, was framed
using the language and concepts of Roman law.8 The most important of
these Roman law concepts to this debate were those of ius, dominium,
imperium, and iurisdictio.
In early Roman law, the concept of ius was used to refer to the out-
come of a "method of divine judgement."9 Disputants were required to
take an oath attesting to the righteousness of their claim, and these
claims would then be tested by "ordeal or other supernatural judgement.
The favorable verdict was a ius."'°A ius was thus both "something objec-
tively right" and something intimately connected with "private, bilateral
relationships" and the "right way in which two disputants should behave
towards each other ... ."" A ius could also come into existence through
agreements, such as agreements between neighbors. The objective and
relational quality of ius distinguished it from the concept of dominium.
Classical lawyers distinguished between "having dominium in something
and having a ius in it."'2 Dominium was not constituted through agree-
ments or relationships. Instead, it was "simply given by the fact, as it
7. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 60 (1999).
8. See id. at 38-67 (discussing the twelfth-century recovery of Roman law in Western
Europe). For two analyses of the importance of Roman law to debates about the limits of im-
perial authority during the medieval and early modem periods, see DAVID ARMITAGE, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 29-36 (2000); ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF
ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE c.1500-c.1800, at
11-28 (1995).
9. RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 8
(1979).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at lO.
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seemed to the Romans, of a man's total control over his physical world
.... 10' In the later Empire, the distinction between notions of ius and
dominium would become much less clean-cut. As the Emperor became
more powerful and able to intervene in all aspects of life, the idea that a
citizen might have "total control over his physical world" began to seem
"increasingly implausible." 4 Everything, including dominium, was me-
diated through the Emperor. The Emperor was the citizen "with whom
all other Roman citizens had the most extensive relationships."'5 Domin-
ium began increasingly to be seen as a form of ius.
Nonetheless, the distinction between ius as an objective right that
was ultimately determinable by divine judgment, and dominium as a
form of property that was determined by control over the physical world,
would reappear in medieval debates over the reach of papal or imperial
authority. Central to those debates was the question of whether either the
Pope or the Holy Roman Emperor could properly claim to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction (ius dicere) as dominus mundi or lord of the world.
The idea that the papacy and the Emperor exercised dual forms of uni-
versal jurisdiction shaped medieval legal thought. 6 The extent of papal
and imperial jurisdiction, and the relation between jurisdiction and con-
trol (or ius and fact), had important implications both within and beyond
Europe.
The question of the extent of papal jurisdiction was at the heart of
the dispute about the legitimacy of Alexander VI's Bulls of Donation,
through which the Spanish Crown claimed dominium over the New
World. The papal bull Inter caetera, issued by Alexander VI in 1493,
granted to "the illustrious sovereigns" King Ferdinand and Queen Isa-
bella, and to their "heirs and successors, kings of Castile and Leon," "all
islands and mainlands found and to be found, discovered and to be dis-
covered" in the Atlantic world "towards the west and south" of a
line bisecting the Atlantic ocean.'7 The proviso to this "gift, grant, and
assignment" was that "no right acquired by any Christian prince, who
may be in actual possession of said islands and mainlands" could be
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 12.
16. JAMES MULDOON, EMPIRE AND ORDER: THE CONCEPT OF EMPIRE, 800-1800, at 65
(1999).
17. ALEXANDER VI, THE BULL INTER CAETERA (1493), as reprinted in EUROPEAN
TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES TO
1648, at 71, 75-78 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., 1917).
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"withdrawn or taken away."' 8 By implication, imperium and dominium
did not vest with indigenous peoples.' 9
The Spanish crown interpreted Inter caetera and the other Bulls of
Donation as grants that authorized Spanish dominium over the lands they
"discovered" in the New World. Ferdinand and Isabella appeared to be-
lieve not only that the Pope had the authority to dispose of dominium
over lands in the New World, but that they needed a papal grant in order
to acquire dominium over such lands. 0 The Bulls of Donation were
drafted in consultation with Ferdinand and Isabella, and proof of the
value that the Spanish monarchs attached to the bulls can be seen "in
their anxiety that the things which they desired should be incorporated in
them, and also in the revisions to which ... they subsequently caused
them to be subjected."'" The bulls continued to be invoked both by the
Spanish crown and by its imperial rivals in debates over the legal justifi-
cations for Spanish conquest of the New World until the late seventeenth
22
century. To take just one example, when Sir Francis Drake returned to
England after his circumnavigation of the world in September 1580, with
reports of having claimed land including Nova Albion (today's Califor-
nia or Oregon) and with commodities from the West Indies and South
America, the Spanish ambassador Mendoza lodged a formal complaint
with Queen Elizabeth. Mendoza claimed "that these territories be-
longed to the King of Spain by virtue of first discovery and the papal
bull of donation. 24
In return, almost every "French or English attack on the claims to
Spanish sovereignty overseas ... [began] with a rejection of the validity
of both the Bulls and the terms of the Treaty of Tordesillas. 25 Most chal-
lenges to the validity of the Bulls of Donation argued that the Pope did
not have jurisdiction to grant rights to territory. Perhaps the most famous
of these were the challenges to Spanish conquest of the New World
posed by Francisco de Vitoria and his followers. Vitoria argued that "the
[P]ope has no dominion (dominium) in the lands of the infidel" and those
who think that the Pope "has temporal authority and jurisdiction over all
princes in the world, are wrong. 26 According to Vitoria, "the [Plope has
18. Id. at 77.
19. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 17 (2004).
20. H. Vander Linden, Alexander VI and the Demarcation of the Maritime and Colonial
Domains of Spain and Portugal, 1493-1494,22 AM. HIsT. REV. 1, 15-16 (1916).
21. Id. at 16.
22. MACMILLAN, supra note 1, at 66-74; PAGDEN, supra note 8, at 48.
23. MACMILLAN, supra note 1, at 52, 75.
24. Id. at 75.
25. PAGDEN, supra note 8, at 48.
26. VITORIA, supra note 1, at 84.
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no power, at least in the ordinary course of events, to judge the cases of
princes, or the titles of jurisdictions or realms .... "27 While Vitoria did
accept that the Pope had authority "to use temporal means" where neces-
sary to fulfill a spiritual purpose,2 he considered that this did not give the
Pope authority "to award rights of imperium and dominium over terra
incognita, which was within the jurisdiction of temporal, Roman law., 29
The spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope thus did not extend to the temporal
world. A similar challenge to the legitimacy of the Bulls of Donation was
made by the Anglican priest Richard Hakluyt the younger. Hakluyt ar-
gued that the Pope had no authority to dispose of or distribute
"kingdomes and empires ....,3o According to Hakluyt, ecclesiastical
jurisdiction "hath nothinge to doe with absolution donation and devid-
inge of mere temporalities and earthly kingdomes."3' The Bulls of
Donation therefore posed no limitations upon the rights of the English to
trade, settle, or plant in the New World, as "no Pope had any lawfull auc-
thoritie to give any suche donation at all."32
There were, however, some advisers to the English crown who ac-
cepted that the Pope had jurisdiction to make the donation of territory
and invest the Spanish king with rights to the New World. In particular,
this argument was made by the "English renaissance polymath" John
Dee,33 who was one of the advisers commissioned by Elizabeth to con-
sider whether, and on what basis, English activities in the New World
could be justified. Dee's writings drew on his training in geography and
mathematics, as well as his knowledge of law and history 4 Unlike some
of his contemporaries, Dee was prepared to concede that Alexander VI
had "authoretie" to "gift" land in the New World and that such an act
was "of force sufficient by Gods lawe or mans lawe against all other
Christian princes.,,3' Dee was willing to accept that the Pope had such
authority because he saw "the jurisdiction assumed by the [P]ope and his
bull" as "legally analogous to that of Elizabeth" and the letters patent she
issued to petitioners seeking authorization to claim dominium over
27. Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 92.
29. MACMILLAN, supra note 1, at 68.
30. HAKLUYT, supra note 1, at 130.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 129; see also MACMILLAN, supra note 1, at 67 (discussing Hakluyt's chal-
lenge to papal authority).
33. Ken MacMillan, Introduction: Discourse on History, Geography, and Law, in JOHN
DEE, THE LIMITS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1, 2 (Ken MacMillan & Jennifer Abeles eds., 2004).
34. See generally DEE, supra note 33.
35. Id. at 91; see also id. at 92-93 (challenging the Iberian interpretation of the grant as
being too liberal because, according to Dee, the bull was intended by the Pope to be proscrip-
tive and to limit Spanish domination of the New World to a particular geographically defined
area); MACMILLAN, supra note 1, at 49-78 (providing a detailed analysis of Dee's arguments).
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territories in the New World.36 For Dee, Elizabeth, as "the leader of the
Anglican Church and a holder of imperium," was able to "authorize set-
tlement in the New World," in the same way that "the [P]ope, the leader
of the Catholic Church and a holder of imperium" was able to donate
territory.37 Just as the Spanish conquistadores traced their rights to terri-
tory in the New World to the Bulls of Donation, English settlers and
trading companies traced their rights to territory in the New World to the
letters patent issued by Elizabeth. Both the papal bulls and the letters
patent were represented as exercises of jurisdiction, through which the
power to authorize rights to territory was expressed in writing. These
documents did not simply claim jurisdiction but also performed jurisdic-
tion. By this I mean that jurisdiction involves the process by which a
worldly claimant to authority is transformed through the successful per-
formance of the power to declare the law. To the extent that the Pope or
Elizabeth claimed to have a form of jurisdiction that enabled them to
declare rights to title in far-flung territories, they represented themselves
as something other than mere tyrants or de facto rulers whose armies or
followers were able to gain control of territory by force.
In addition to debates over the extent of the spiritual jurisdiction ex-
ercised by the Pope, the extent of the Holy Roman Emperor's
jurisdiction was also contested within Europe and beyond. The secular
jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Emperor was conceived of as universal.
The medieval jurist Bartolus of Sassoferrato made this clear in his de-
fense of the claim that the Emperor was lord of the world despite the fact
that "foreign peoples, the cities of Italy, and the kings of France and
England did not obey him."3 Bartolus sought to show that the Emperor's
universal jurisdiction could survive and co-exist with the new forms of
territorial jurisdiction beginning to be exercised by princes and kings.
The Emperor was lord of the world, not because he was lord of all the
particular things, places, and people in the world, but rather because "he
alone had dominium over the world considered as a single whole., 39 Bar-
tolus defended this claim by distinguishing between the universal
jurisdiction of the Emperor and the particular jurisdictions of other rul-
ers, such as the Kings of England and France. The two could coexist
because they were of a different nature. The universal jurisdiction of the
Emperor involved jurisdiction "over the world considered as a single
whole" rather than as a collection of "particular things," while the juris-
diction of Kings constituted jurisdiction over particular things (such as
36. MACMILLAN, supra note 1, at 73, 107.
37. Id. at 73.
38. CONSTANTIN FASOLT, THE LIMITS OF HISTORY 192 (2004).
39. Id.
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England or France).' Jurisdiction was not an effect of power, but a form
of power. The Emperor had universal jurisdiction over the world as a
matter of right, not as a question of fact. However, when ambitious mon-
archs like Charles V or Ferdinand I succeeded to the title of Emperor,
they sought to combine temporal authority with the universal rights to
which they felt entitled as rulers of the Roman Empire.4 ' As a result, the
reach of imperial authority became far more worldly and far more
threatening to peace in Europe.
The rulers of emerging States in Europe thus faced "two universal
antagonists outside their own realms," in the form of the Papacy and the
Empire.42 Both claimed authority as a supranational body descended
from the Roman Empire, and both alleged that this legacy gave them
universal jurisdiction, understood as the power to state what is lawful for
the whole world. Those who opposed medieval forms of government
sought to counter papal and imperial authority with detailed arguments
showing why the claim to be dominus mundi or lord of the world was
flawed. As the next Section shows, these statist arguments were prem-
ised on the claim that sovereignty, and thus jurisdiction, depended upon
de facto control over territory. Worldly authority, to be legitimate, must
be effective.
B. Protection, Control, and the Modern State
As the State emerged to challenge the authority of the Holy Roman
Empire, scholars like Thomas Hobbes developed detailed arguments
grounding the authority of the State in its capacity to guarantee protec-
tion. Indeed, to invoke protection as the "primary raison d'6tre" of the
State is to be in a complicated relation to a long tradition of absolutist
theories such as that of Hobbes.43 In his LEVIATHAN, Hobbes argued that
the creation of a political order depended upon the establishment of a
common power with the capacity to protect its subjects. This common
power is "made by covenant of every man with every man.'' Through
that covenant, the commonwealth was entrusted with sovereign power
for a particular end-"the procuration of the safety of the people ...."
According to Hobbes, the lawful authority is the one who achieves pro-
tection in the broad sense of bringing into being a condition in which the
40. Id.
41. See id. at 93 (discussing Ferdinand H1).
42. ARMITAGE, supra note 8, at 33.
43. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, supra note 5.
44. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 114 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651).
45. Id. at 222.
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safety of the people can be achieved. This was the "office," or in other
46
words the responsibility, of the sovereign.
Hobbes thus based his defense of power on its present efficacy rather
than on the validity of its origins. His was a theory that spoke to condi-
tions of conquest and of civil war. Hobbes argued that the continual
debate about the legitimacy of the conditions under which authority was
first constituted was radically destabilizing and ultimately irresolvable.
By refusing to anchor the legitimacy of the commonwealth in its capac-
ity to represent a romantic or historical collectivity of the people,
Hobbes "pulled the rug out" from under arguments based on the nation
as a "platform of resistance" to tyranny or misrule.4 '7 For Hobbes, the
question of public authority did not turn on issues of authenticity, or on
who was the true representative of God or the people. The authority of
such a common power was instead grounded on its capacity in fact to
ensure protection in accordance with the terms of the covenant. Indeed,
Hobbes argued that the "obligation of subjects" to obey the sovereign
would "last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is
able to protect them. 48 The linkage of sovereignty and protection thus
emerged alongside the modern State, as a way of distinguishing the
State's de facto capacity to protect from de jure claims to authority,
whether those claims were made by the peasantry (such as the revolu-
tionary claimants to authority in seventeenth century England), the Pope,
the Holy Roman Emperor, or rival claimants to territory in the new
world.49 Jurisdiction and the freedom to legislate at will were not a mat-
ter of right, but a consequence of the fact of control. The State was the
form in which human beings could declare their independence from past
obligations and ancient texts, and express their freedom to shape the fu-
ture.50
With the triumph of the modern State and the demise of the Holy
Roman Empire, debates over the divisibility of power ceased to be
framed in terms of the competition between imperial and state jurisdic-
46. The history of linking sovereignty and protection in order to justify state authority
has been invoked by Edward Luck, the U.N. Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect.
See Edward C. Luck, U.N. Special Advisor, Statement to the UNSC Working Group on Con-
flict Resolution and Prevention in Africa, (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/eupdate/1965 (last visited June 6, 2009)
("From the dawn of the nation-state era, it has been the intrinsic and inherent responsibility of
the sovereign to offer protection to its people. In return, they offer their loyalty. What higher
purpose could sovereignty serve?").
47. ISTVAN HONT, JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE NA-
TION-STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 130 (2005).
48. HOBBES, supra note 44, at 147.
49. Anne Orford, Lawful Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, in LEGALITY AND
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Richard Falk et al. eds., forthcoming 2009).
50. FASOLT, supra note 38, at 7-10.
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tion. However, this is not to say that the demise of the Holy Roman Em-
pire meant that power was understood to be unified in the form of the
sovereign, as the mythologizing of absolutist theorists of the State would
seem to suggest. It was certainly no longer plausible to argue that the
Holy Roman Emperor had universal jurisdiction as lord of the world,
while princes had rights to particular jurisdiction, and that both forms of
jurisdiction could apply over the same territory. However, the idea that
power might be divided, or that people, places, and things might be sub-
ject to plural sources of law, did not disappear. Instead, it changed form.
In particular, it persisted in two debates that inform contemporary inter-
national law.
The first debate concerns the question of whether the recognition of
a government, or even of a new State, by external actors should be un-
derstood as declaratory or constitutive. According to the declaratory
theory, which was dominant until at least the late eighteenth century, the
"legal status" of a ruler was understood to be "derived and perfected
from within.' 5 As a result, "internal legality determines external legality
... ,,52 Within Europe, the law of nature and of nations had little to say
about the basis of state legitimacy. The question of whether a duly ap-
pointed or elected ruler properly had authority over territory was not
treated as a question for interstate relations. If the people of a State
thought a person "worthy of election to the throne of their country and
useful to their welfare," that election was not "capable of being validly
challenged by other States."53 To give foreign rulers or powers "the right
to recognition ... would mean intervention and result in submission
which would stultify the fundamental right of States to equality guaran-
teed by the law of nature and nations. 54 If the legitimacy of a
government were understood to depend upon external recognition or
championing by external powers, the uneasy peace that existed in the
aftermath of the European wars of religion could quickly unravel. Thus
the de facto existence of control over territory was sufficient to establish
sovereignty.
Yet beginning in the early nineteenth century, the law of nations be-
gan to treat statehood as a question that was not determined only
internally. International lawyers such as Henry Wheaton were confronted
with "frequent changes in membership of the Family of Nations" as a
result of revolutions in Europe and the New World,5  and questions about
51. C.H. Alexandrowicz, The Theory of Recognition In Fieri, 1958 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
176, 179.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 177.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 196.
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the normative criteria of statehood began to appear in urgent need of
resolution. Wheaton and his contemporaries began to argue that while
"internal sovereignty" was a question of "factual formation[,]" "external
sovereignty" of a State "was not derived from within," but instead re-
quired "action from without which must be taken by the existing
Member States of the Family of Nations. 56 States began to treat external
recognition as an act that "renders the sovereignty of a new State perfect
and complete. 57 In this sense, de facto control over territory was no
longer sufficient to ground a claim to statehood.
The second way in which an uncertainty about the relation between
right and power, or jurisdiction and control over territory, persisted was
in relation to the question of whether individuals within a State had fun-
damental rights that derived from a source other than the positive law of
the State. While States were understood to have public authority over all
people and things within their jurisdiction, from the seventeenth century
onwards private individuals were also understood to have a form of
"subjective right" to property in their persons, liberty, and estates that
could coexist with, and constrain, public authority.58 These inalienable
property rights were argued to derive from a source other than social,
political, or legal convention and to fix "limits on the powers of govern-
ment."'59
As the next Part shows, both the debate about the role of external ac-
tors in determining the legitimacy of governments and the debate about
the extent to which fundamental rights represented a constraint on state
action became linked to international jurisdiction with the creation of the
United Nations.
56. Id. at 195; see also JENNIFER L. BEARD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DESIRE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEVELOPMENT AND THE NATION STATE 124-49 (2007) (offering a
critical reading of these practices of recognition).
57. Alexandrowicz, supra note 51, at 195.
58. This modem division of jurisdiction and property is explained by Hugo Grotius. 2
HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 457 (Liberty Fund, 2005) (1625) (com-
menting that "altho' Jurisdiction and Property are usually acquired by one and the same Act,
yet they are in themselves really distinct; and therefore Property may be transferred, not only
to those of the same State, but even to Foreigners too, the Jurisdiction remaining as it was
before'"); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56
(2d ed. 2006) (offering a contemporary differentiation of public authority and private owner-
ship: "Territorial sovereignty is not ownership of but goveming power with respect to
territory.").
59. Cary J. Nederman, Property and Protest: Political Theory and Subjective Rights in
Fourteenth-Century England, 58 REv. POL. 323, 327 (1996).
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II. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION
A. International Jurisdiction Under the U.N. Charter
International law has long treated effective control over territory as
an important criterion of statehood. 60 In that sense, statehood is prem-
ised upon de facto authority. Yet the creation of the United Nations in
1945 saw the emergence of an international regime in which the prin-
ciples of self-determination, sovereign equality, and the prohibition
against acquisition of territory through the use of force were also
treated as central to determining the lawfulness of particular claimants
to authority.6' These principles shaped the process of decolonization
and delegitimized alien rule. The preamble of the U.N. Charter also
expressed a determination "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
,,62 fat
rights" and "the dignity and worth of the human person. That faith
would inform the body of international human rights law and interna-
tional humanitarian law that developed over the course of the twentieth
century as a constraint on state action. Under the U.N. Charter, the law-
fulness of authority over a given territory was thus treated as a matter
both of fact and of right.
That understanding of state authority informed the way that the U.N.
Charter attempted to formulate the relationship between state and inter-
national jurisdiction. As the authority of sovereign States was understood
to be an expression both of effective control over territory and of funda-
mental principles such as the right to self-determination, external
intervention in the internal affairs of States was primafacie illegitimate.
Yet, because the legitimacy of state authority had become a matter for
international law, as overseen by an organization with supranational au-
thority, intervention in the internal affairs of States must also, in some
circumstances, be legitimate. As the earlier debates about the role of ex-
ternal actors in recognizing elected monarchs or revolutionary States
made clear, the treatment of authority as a matter for international law
opened up new possibilities for destabilizing external intervention and
new threats to peace. It was the task of the U.N. Charter to articulate the
jurisdictional grounds upon which the new organization might exercise
its authority to police and perfect the State, while at the same time estab-
lishing a commitment to fundamental principles of sovereign equality
and self-determination.
The U.N. Charter attempts to settle these jurisdictional questions by
authorizing international intervention in two distinct situations. First, the
60. CRAWFORD, supra note 58, at 37-89.
61. Id. at 96-173.
62. U.N. Charter pmbl.
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preamble to the Charter provides that "armed force shall not be used,
save in the common interest ' 63 and all Members agree to "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force" in any manner
"inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."64 The Charter
vests the international police function in the Security Council-the organ
given the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security. 6 Like the other organs of the United Nations, the
Security Council is effectively given the power to determine the extent of
its jurisdiction, including its jurisdiction to authorize force when there is
a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." 66 To the
extent that there are limitations on Security Council jurisdiction, they
have been seen to flow from Articles 24 and 39 of the Charter, which
establish the scope of the police function of the Security Council and its
role within the broader Charter system.67 The Council determines
whether a particular event triggers its jurisdiction under Chapter VII, and
decides what measures should be taken to restore peace and security.61
Any decision by the Security Council to authorize the use of force
against a State requires its Members to submit to the discipline of a mul-
tilateral decision-making process. 9 This commitment to multilateralism
has been seen as a significant bulwark against a resurgence of imperial-
ism. 70 It means that a powerful State does not have the right to undertake
police action against another State without Security Council authoriza-
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 2(4).
65. Id. art. 24(1); see also Hans Kelsen, Collective Security Under International Law 4,
114, 142 n.20 (Int'l Law Studies Series No. 49, 1957) (characterizing the collective security
system established under the U.N. Charter in terms of international police action); Martti
Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View, 6 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 325, 344 (1995) (analyzing the Security Council as "the technician of peace, the
police").
66. For the broad principle that each U.N. organ "must, in the first place at least, deter-
mine its own jurisdiction," see Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph
2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, at 168 (July 20); see also THOMAS M.
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 5-6
(2002) (discussing the practice by which the political organs of the United Nations have de-
termined their own jurisdiction).
67. U.N. Charter art. 24 (providing that "In discharging these duties the Security Coun-
cil shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations"); id. art. 39
(granting to the Security Council the authority to "determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to "decide what measures shall be taken
... to maintain or restore international peace and security").
68. Id. art. 39.
69. Id. art. 27.
70. See generally Ralph Zacklin, Former Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs,
United Nations, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture at the University of Cambridge: The
United Nations Secretariat and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World (Jan. 22-24, 2008) (tran-
script available in the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law), available at
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/lectures/2007-08_ralphzacklin.php (last visited June 6, 2009).
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tion. For lawyers, the "hard" or enforceable legal regime governing
peace and security is premised upon a commitment to the core principles
of sovereign equality, self-determination, and territorial integrity. These
principles have been seen as desirable both in achieving realist ends
(preserving the status quo and the international order from the threat of
world wars and mass destruction) and for more idealistic reasons (a
commitment to international justice and the defense of newly decolo-
nized States from hegemonic powers with imperial appetites).
The Charter also envisages a second and more expansive jurisdiction
to regulate Member States. The Charter seeks to advance peace, justice,
and the public good by encouraging States to protect and promote hu-
man rights and to achieve economic development. The U.N. Charter not
only established a "hard" regime governing public law questions relating
to territory and the use of force, but also a "soft" regime concerned with
economic and social issues. 7 The soft regime was institutionally based in
the more democratic organ of the General Assembly. The more expan-
sive jurisdiction of the General Assembly was balanced against the lack
of enforcement mechanisms available to it. Resolutions could be passed
dealing with a wide range of issues of social and economic importance,
but no real mechanisms existed for obliging States to comply with these
resolutions.72 The broad "public good" jurisdiction of the international
community is also limited by Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.73 Article
2(7) limits (or, more often, fails to limit) soft forms of U.N. intervention
(for example, involving the work of human rights bodies or the General
Assembly) in what might otherwise have been understood to be the
sphere of a State's domestic jurisdiction.
The relation between hard (or public) and soft (or private) U.N. ac-
tivity became the subject of contest almost as soon as it was enshrined in
the U.N. Charter. Already by the 1950s, the distinction between the work
of the Security Council and that of the General Assembly began to break
down. The General Assembly started to concern itself with security mat-
ters, beginning with the Uniting for Peace Resolution passed in 1950 in
response to the Soviet veto of Security Council resolutions endorsing
71. Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 336.
72. Id. at 338-39.
73. The U.N. Charter provides that:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
[S]tate or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
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U.N. intervention in the Korean War." Peacekeeping thus emerged in the
early 1950s, alongside the process of decolonization, as a means of re-
sponding to conflict over territory, threats to the sanctity of former
colonial investments, and civil war in post-colonial States. As the Gen-
eral Assembly began to be dominated by newly decolonized States, it
also began to pass resolutions, such as those concerned with the new in-
ternational economic order, questioning the liberal distinction between
public and private, order and justice.75 The Security Council, in turn, be-
gan to concern itself with broader public good questions-both within
and between States. In addition, at various times during the 1960s and
1970s, States justified their use of force against neighboring countries by
reference to the notion of humanitarian intervention. Nonetheless, during
the Cold War period, the notion that a powerful State or a coalition of
allies might intervene to rescue or protect the people of another State
could not easily be represented as an apolitical action.
B. Humanitarian Action Under the U.N. Charter
The jurisdictional basis for humanitarian intervention within this re-
gime was always uncertain. Where occupation by foreign States or
administration by international organizations was permitted, it was con-
ceived of as temporary, that is, authorized for limited periods and for
restricted ends. Humanitarian intervention was largely conceived of as
an exceptional measure undertaken in situations of emergency and ex-
treme human suffering, brought somewhat uneasily under an
international jurisdiction to protect peace and security, or more contro-
versially, to represent universal values. Nonetheless, the institutional and
ideological conditions of the post-Cold War period led to the growth of
support amongst policy makers and academics for the idea that force
could legitimately be used as a response to situations of massive human
rights violations within a State. The expanded vision of the meaning of
international peace and security was, in part, a product of the post-Cold
War revitalization of the Security Council. During the Cold War, the Se-
curity Council had been paralyzed by reciprocal use of the veto
exercisable by the five permanent members. The ending of the Cold War
meant an end to that deadlock. The ideological climate of the 1990s also
contributed to the plausibility, for some, of the notion that military inter-
74. The Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377A (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377A
(V) (Nov. 3, 1950). For a discussion of the context in which the Uniting for Peace Resolution
was passed, see William Stueck, The United Nations, the Security Council, and the Korean
War, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT
AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945, at 265 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
75. See, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281
(XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974).
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vention might be benevolent and disinterested-that powerful States
might really come to liberate and not to occupy. It was in this new envi-
ronment that the Security Council, post-1989, proved willing to interpret
its jurisdiction to authorize force so as to include situations of civil war
or humanitarian crisis.
The willingness of the Security Council to expand its jurisdiction
with a broad reading of "threats to the peace" was first evidenced by the
statement issued from its 1992 Summit Meeting. The members of the
Security Council there declared that the "absence of war and military
conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and
security," and that "non-military sources of instability in the economic,
social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace
and security."16 The range and nature of resolutions passed by the Secu-
rity Council in the decade following the end of the Cold War reinforced
the sense that the Council was willing to treat the failure to guarantee
democracy or human rights, or to protect against humanitarian abuses, as
a threat to peace and security.
While these resolutions were hotly debated, they were generally
thought to have "stretched the literal text of Chapter VII" rather than to
have violated the Charter prohibition on recourse to force." These deci-
sions were not seen to threaten the key principles of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, and self-determination. The notion that international
police action was exceptional still governed. More serious questions of
legality and legitimacy arose when the enthusiastic embrace of multilat-
eral intervention extended to support for military action undertaken by
regional organizations without Security Council authorization, most no-
tably the 1999 intervention in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), but also the interventions by the Economic Com-
munity of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The gradual
movement towards the acceptability of collective humanitarian interven-
tion reached a crisis point with these actions undertaken by coalitions of
States without Security Council authorization. The ensuing debate over
humanitarian intervention can be seen as a breaking down of the unsta-
ble boundary between the hard and soft activities of the United
Nations-between policing and justice.
In addition to the debates around humanitarian intervention, humani-
tarian action proceeded under the U.N. Charter in other less visible, but
no less productive, ways. The soft U.N. regime overseen by the General
Assembly involved lawyers in promoting human rights, protecting
76. The President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Coun-
cil, 11, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992).
77. FRANCK, supra note 66, at 137.
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refugees, and introducing the "rule of law" into the economic develop-
ment agenda. While the big questions of intervention and authority were
debated in relation to the use of force and formal control over territory,
international governance quietly expanded through the consensual in-
volvement of the aid, human rights, development, and humanitarian
communities in the administration and management of economic and
social life within African, Middle Eastern, Asian, Latin American, and
Eastern European States."8 The 1990s saw the publication of subtle
analyses by humanitarian actors of the problems that increased soft in-
terventions had begun to produce, particularly in Africa. These analyses,
authored by people who had been involved in development, refugee,
famine assistance, and emergency relief work, were framed in terms of
responsibility and protection. They explored the difficult issues raised by
the involvement of the development enterprise in contributing to condi-
tions leading to genocide,79 the responsibility of protection agencies in
situations where humanitarian spaces and refugee camps were providing
safe havens for belligerents,0 and the effects of the over-inflated claims
that humanitarians made in representing their capacity to offer protection
to people at risk.8' This literature began to ask questions about the law-
fulness or ethics of humanitarian internationalists, both in terms of how
they represented their presence and how they understood their responsi-
bility for the effects of their actions and decisions. It also addressed
issues of effectiveness, asking whether humanitarian protection was in
fact assisting populations at risk, and whether humanitarian actors were
fulfilling their responsibilities to those people they claimed to be assist-
ing. Academic commentators in turn argued that representatives of the
international community were involved in governing, and suggested that
the responsibility of these actors would be better addressed if interna-
tional presence were recognized as an ongoing factor shaping the
dynamics of conflict in the Third World rather than characterized as a
series of temporary interventions .
78. Anne Orford, The Gift of Formalism, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 179 (2004).
79. See, e.g., PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE IN
RWANDA (1998).
80. See, e.g., FIONA TERRY, CONDEMNED TO REPEAT?: THE PARADOX OF HUMANITAR-
IAN ACTION (2002).
81. See, e.g., ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS AND THE DISASTER RELIEF
INDUSTRY IN AFRICA (1997).
82. See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2004); ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
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C. The Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect Concept
The responsibility to protect concept can be seen as one outcome of
these converging sets of institutional. and academic deliberations. As I
have already noted, the concept of the responsibility to protect was pro-
pelled into the internationalist mainstream by ICISS in its report of 2001.
The ICISS was an initiative sponsored by the Canadian government in
response to the perceived tension between state sovereignty and humani-
tarian intervention in the aftermath of the NATO action in Kosovo. In
2001, the ICISS issued a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect.83
The responsibility to protect report was presented as a new way of talk-
ing about humanitarian intervention, as well as a new way of talking
about sovereignty.84 Both were organized around protection. The new
way of talking about sovereignty was to argue that "its essence should
now be seen not as control but as responsibility."85 If a State is unwilling
or unable to meet this responsibility to protect its population, it then falls
upon the international community to do so. The new way of talking
about humanitarian intervention involved re-characterizing the debate
"not as an argument about any right at all but rather about a responsibil-
ity-one to protect people at grave risk. 86 The people at grave risk were
those "[m]illions of human beings" who, in the words of the ICISS re-
port, "remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression
and state collapse."87 With the emergence of the responsibility to protect
concept, we see a movement away from that representation of interven-
tion as an exceptional interference in the domestic affairs of States, and
towards the representation of international presence as authorized, and
indeed mandated, by international legal obligations. The General As-
sembly, in its 2005 World Summit Outcome, endorsed the notion of both
an individual and an international responsibility to protect, stating that
"[t]he international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility ... to help to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." 8
The ICISS report set out a broad range of techniques envisaged as
available to meet the responsibility to protect, well beyond the use of
force or military intervention. According to the ICISS, the responsibility
to protect encompasses a responsibility to prevent conflict, to react to
83. ICISS, supra note 4.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24
Wis. INT'L L.J. 703, 708 (2006).
86. Id.
87. ICISS, supra note 4, at 11.
88. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 139, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 8th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/I (Oct. 24, 2005).
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conflict, and to rebuild after conflict. 9 In doing so, it expands the range
of techniques legally available for meeting the responsibility to protect at
a distance to include the provision of development assistance or "support
for local initiatives to advance good governance, human rights, or the
rule of law,"9 the deployment of good offices missions or mediation ef-
forts, monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses, receiving and
analyzing "sensitive information from [M]ember [S]tates," 9' promoting
better terms of trade for developing economies, reforming military and
state security services, and prosecuting "perpetrators of crimes against
humanity" before the International Criminal Court.92 According to
ICISS, the responsibility to protect also brings with it a responsibility on
the part of the international community "to build a durable peace" in the
aftermath of military intervention.93 "If military intervention is to be con-
templated, the need for a post-intervention strategy is also of paramount
importance."94 In turn, ICISS envisaged that the responsibility to rebuild
that accompanies military intervention "may mean staying in the country
for some period of time after the initial purposes of the intervention have
been accomplished."95' The General Assembly accepted this broad vision
of the kinds of techniques that might be authorized as an exercise of the
responsibility to protect and accepted the ambitious scope of that respon-
sibility.96 U.N. members undertook to help States build "capacity to
protect their populations," assist "those which are under stress before
crises and conflicts break out," establish "an early warning capability,"
and take "collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
Security Council ... should peaceful means be inadequate" to protect
populations.97
The institutionalization of the responsibility to protect concept has led
to a process of systemic integration at and around the United Nations.
Throughout his campaign for U.N. Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon made
clear that he was a strong supporter of the responsibility to protect. Ban
told U.S. audiences in 2006 that "the concept of the international commu-
nity's responsibility to protect ... should be further substantiated" and
vowed that as Secretary-General he would "speak out in favor" of the
89. ICISS, supra note 4, at 19, 29, 39.
90. Id. at 19.
91. Id. at 22.
92. Id. at 24.
93. Id. at 39.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 88, T 139.
97. Id. $ 138-39.
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responsibility to protect. 98 Since his appointment as Secretary-General,
Ban has said he will "spare no effort to operationalize the responsibility
to protect,"99 and has spoken of the need to "turn promise into practice,
words into deeds. '' The Secretary-General signaled the emphasis to be
placed on the responsibility to protect with the creation of two senior
positions to oversee its implementation. Francis Deng was appointed to
the newly styled position of U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide in 2007 and Edward Luck was appointed to the new position
of Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Pro-
tect in 2008. The two advisers "share an office on genocide prevention
and RtoP [the responsibility to protect], helping the United Nations to
speak and act as one."'' According to Luck, the aim of the responsibility
to protect concept is to create "interagency cooperation," "a common
policy and operational strategy," and an "integrated framework" for ac-
tivities in areas including conflict prevention, capacity-building,
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and security sector reform.'°2 A
range of actors, from U.S. Naval Academy counter-insurgency special-
ists to U.N. officials, human rights activists, and Christian aid workers,
have now begun enthusiastically to re-describe and re-conceptualize
their missions in terms of protection. These actors have also begun to
integrate activities across a remarkable range of areas within a protection
framework and to call upon States to do the same.' 3 Moves to institu-
98. Ban Ki-moon's Positions on Human Rights, The Responsibility to Protect, Interna-
tional Criminal Court, UNSGELECTION.ORG (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.unsgselection.org/
content/latest-developments/issue-34-19-october-2006-ban-ki-moon's-positions-on-human-
rights-the-responsibility-to-protect-intemational-criminal-court/173 (last visited June 6, 2009).
99. Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Address to the Summit of the African Union
(Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search-full.asp?
statlD= 180# (last visited June 6, 2009).
100. Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Address at Event Entitled "Responsible
Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World" (July 15, 2008) (transcript
available from the U.N. Department of Public Information), available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2008/sgsml 1701.doc.htm (last visited June 6, 2009) [hereinafter Ki-moon,
Responsible Sovereignty].
101. Id.
102. EDWARD C. LUCK, STANLEY FOUND., POLICY ANALYSIS BRIEF: THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2008), available at http://www.stanleyfdn.
org/publications/pab/LuckPAB808.pdf (last visited June 6, 2009).
103. See, e.g., Letter from William R. Pace, Executive Director, World Federalist Move-
ment-Institute for Global Policy, to Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers (Sept. 22,
2008), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.orglindex.php/civil-societystatements/
1859?theme=altl (last visited June 6, 2009) (urging governments to "support the Responsibil-
ity to Protect through words and actions in the upcoming 63rd Session of the [U.N.] General
Assembly"). Thirty-five non-governmental organizations signed the letter, including Human
Rights Watch (U.S.), the International Crisis Group (United States), the International Refugee
Rights Initiative (Uganda), the Executive Secretariat of the International Conference on the
Great Lakes Region (Burundi), Coalition for the International Criminal Court (South Africa),
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tionalize the responsibility to protect are thus leading to a coordinated
project of intensification and rationalization of international administra-
tion.
States and regional organizations have also embraced the responsi-
bility to protect concept, apparently with much greater willingness than
was the case with humanitarian intervention. Member States voted un-
animously in the General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit to adopt
the responsibility to protect as an obligation both of individual Member
States and of the international community.' Since then, representatives
of States including Australia, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States have specifically invoked the responsibility to protect
to explain actions taken or proposed by their governments. In addition,
regional organizations such as the African Union (A.U.) have formally
endorsed the responsibility to protect concept.' 5 Thus the responsibility
to protect concept is increasingly being invoked as one of the purposes
towards which state institutions are being directed.'0
The responsibility to protect concept thus appears to envisage a
greatly expanded scope of authority for the international community.
Under the U.N. Charter, humanitarian intervention and international ad-
ministration were occasionally tolerated as temporary or emergency
measures, but de jure authority was always understood to remain with
the sovereign State. In contrast, the advocates of the responsibility to
protect concept seek to make an argument for the lawfulness of both
state and international authority, without reference to self-determination,
popular sovereignty, or other de jure bases for determining who should
have the power to govern in a particular territory. The responsibility to
protect concept rejects the automatic priority of claims to authority based
on right, whether that right be understood in historical, universal, or de-
mocratic terms. Rather, the legitimacy of authority is determinable by
the Church of Sweden (Sweden), DanChurch Aid (Denmark), the National Council of
Churches in Australia (Australia), and the World Federalist Movement (Canada).
104. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 88, 1139.
105. African Union, Executive Council, The Common African Position on the Proposed
Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, AU Doc. Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) (Mar. 7-
8, 2005) (adopting the principle of the responsibility to protect); see also African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution on Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect in
Africa, A.C.H.P.R./Res. 117 (XXXXII) (Nov. 28, 2007) (endorsing the 2007 Security Council
decision to deploy an A.U./U.N. Hybrid Operation in Darfur as an exercise of the responsibil-
ity to protect).
106. This practice is arguably contributing to a reformulation of the international law
relating to nonintervention. For a reformulation of the opinio juris element of customary in-
ternational law formation in terms of "the arguments used by political elites to drive the
institutions of the [S]tate into motion," see Anthony Carty, The Iraq Invasion as a Recent
United Kingdom 'Contribution to International Law', 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 143, 144 (2005).
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reference to the fact of protection.0 7 The legitimacy of authority-
whether of States or of the international community--depends on the
capacity to provide effective protection to populations at risk. By focus-
ing upon de facto authority, the responsibility to protect concept
implicitly asserts not only that an international community exists, but
also that its authority to govern is, at least in situations of civil war and
repression, superior to that of the State.
III. AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION, AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Many States were concerned at the potential expansion of interna-
tional authority that might flow from the endorsement of the
responsibility to protect concept, and sought to limit the scope of inter-
national protective authority with a narrow definition of the triggers to
international jurisdiction. This Part explores the ways in which the World
Summit Outcome articulates the nature and extent of state and interna-
tional jurisdiction in relation to the responsibility to protect. Discussions
about the limits of a particular jurisdiction are often the site of "law's
own most self-reflexive operations."'' 8 Jurisdiction involves the estab-
lishment or articulation of power as and through public law. In
articulating the nature and limits of power through public law, legal de-
terminations of jurisdiction give a conventional or shared meaning to
authority and to its objects. As Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh
suggest, "[ilt is through jurisdiction that a life before the law is insti-
tuted, a place is subjected to rule and occupation, and an event is
articulated as juridical."' ' The jurisdictional practices related to the re-
sponsibility to protect are the specific techniques by which life in the
new zones of protection is marked as belonging to international law;
places are subjected to the rule of international law and events are articu-
lated as legally relevant.
A. Jurisdiction and the Territorial State
The traditional principle that each State has jurisdiction over its terri-
tory is reinforced in the World Summit Outcome. It stresses that each
"individual [S]tate" has "the responsibility to protect its populations
107. See ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (forthcoming 2010).
108. BRADIN CORMACK, A POWER TO Do JUSTICE: JURISDICTION, ENGLISH LITERATURE,
AND THE RISE OF COMMON LAW, 1509-1625, at 22 (2007).
109. Shaunnagh Dorsett & Shaun McVeigh, Questions of Jurisdiction, in JURISPRU-
DENCE OF JURISDICTION, supra note 6, at 3, 5.
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from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against human-
ity" and that this extends to "the prevention of such crimes, including
their incitement." Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has, in turn, empha-
sized that "[g]ovemments unanimously affirmed the primary and
continuing legal obligations of States to protect their populations," and
has described this as the "bedrock" principle of the responsibility to pro-
tect." ° The State continues to exercise primary jurisdiction over its
territory and has the responsibility to protect the population within that
territory. The World Summit Outcome and the officials charged with its
implementation thus reaffirm that the world is divided into spatially de-
fined units, within which politics takes place. The responsibility to
protect concept takes as a given that physical space exists as a series of
defined and bounded territories. Each territory can be "associated or
identified with a sovereign ... ."" The entity with primary control over,
and responsibility for, the inhabitants of those territories is the sovereign
State. If people are not protected or are at risk, this is a manifestation of
the failure of the State to meet its responsibility to protect its population.
The responsibility to protect concept thus diagnoses a problem. The
problem it diagnoses is the tyranny of state governments and the threat
posed to security when the State has unconditional control over a terri-
tory and population. Tyranny here has a very modem meaning. Where
once tyrants were those who exercised de facto authority by force and
had a "lack of respect for law," in the modern world tyrants are those
who interfere with the subjective rights of individuals to property in life,
liberty, or estate."'
B. Jurisdiction and the Limits of International Authority
The responsibility to protect concept challenges the tyranny of state
leaders or militias from the position or "political viewpoint" of the peo-
ple and their material interests-that is, their need for protection.I ,,3 Yet it
does not propose to vest the power wrested from the State in the people,
or at least not immediately. Instead, the responsibility to protect litera-
110. See Ban, Responsible Sovereignty, supra note 100.
111. Shaunnagh Dorsett, Mapping Territories, in JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION,
supra note 6, at 137-38.
112. See FASOLT, supra note 38, at 201, 281 n.130 (discussing Bodin's assertion that "the
true mark of the tyrant is not his relationship to law but his lack of respect for property" and
commenting that this "is about as good a definition of tyranny as can be expected under mod-
em circumstances."). For a discussion of the political theory of "'subjective' property rights:'
see Nederman, supra note 59, at 324.
113. My analysis of the difference between the subject of the political viewpoint from
which a problem is diagnosed, and the subject of the political practice needed to respond to
that problem, is informed by Louis ALTHUSSER, MACHIAVELLI AND Us 25-26 (Franqois Ma-
theron ed., Gregory Elliot trans., 1999).
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ture fixes another place-"the place of the force that must be consti-
tuted" in response to the political problem it has diagnosed."' In the
World Summit Outcome, this place is called "the international commu-
nity.""' 5 The international community is the name given to the place of
the force that must be constituted to resolve the problem of state tyranny
or the failure of protection. The responsibility to protect concept pro-
vides that in certain situations, where a State manifestly fails to protect
its population, state authority must give way to that of the international
community.
The jurisdictional basis for an international responsibility to protect
is quite different to the jurisdictional basis previously proffered for hu-
manitarian action under the U.N. Charter, whether that action took the
form of military intervention, conflict prevention, or international ad-
ministration. Early reports and documents relating to the responsibility
to protect had referred in very broad terms to the situations in which the
international community might have jurisdiction to exercise that respon-
sibility. For example, the ICISS report had referred to the "[m]illions of
human beings" who "remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies,
state repression and state collapse."' 16 The report discussed the need to
deliver "practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives,
because their [S]tates are unwilling or unable to protect them.""7 Accord-
ing to the report, States have a responsibility to protect their populations
from threats including "mass killing," "systematic rape" and "starva-
tion."' 18 Both "the [S]tate whose people are directly affected" and "the
broader community of [S]tates" have a responsibility to provide "life-
supporting protection and assistance to populations at risk."" 9 Where
there is a threat of "large scale loss of life" or "large scale 'ethnic clean-
sing,"' the report found that military intervention by the international
community is justified. 20
In contrast, when the World Summit of the General Assembly en-
dorsed the responsibility to protect, it made a significant change in the
formulation of jurisdiction. The World Summit Outcome describes the
international responsibility to protect as a responsibility "to help to pro-
tect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity."'2 ' The proposal to link the responsibility to protect
114. Id. at 25.
115. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 88, 139.
116. ICISS, supra note 4, at 11.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 17.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted).
121. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 88, 139.
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populations with the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic clean-
sing, and crimes against humanity was put forward by Pakistan's
Ambassador to the United Nations, H.E. Akram Mounir, in the lead-up
to the 2005 World Summit. 22 Pakistan, like "most countries of the South
at the level of the Non-[A]ligned Movement," was strongly opposed to
the concept of the responsibility to protect.2 3 The introduction of the
amendment linking the responsibility to protect to specific crimes was
designed to address the fears of those who viewed the principle "as an
instrument that could be used by the powerful countries against the
weaker ones."'
124
Thus the protective jurisdiction of the international community as ar-
ticulated in the World Summit Outcome is organized around the subject
matter jurisdiction of international criminal law. This appears to be quite
a novel use of international criminal law categories. The subject matter
jurisdiction of international criminal law has traditionally been under-
stood to represent "principles on the basis of which States can exercise
criminal jurisdiction" outside their own territories "in conformity with
international law."' 25 It has been used to explain when a foreign State
and, later, the international community, might exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion-that is, the power to judge and to punish. There have been other
moves to extend the reach of international criminal law beyond the
sphere of criminal jurisdiction and punishment. In particular, in its 2007
judgment in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice found that Contracting Parties to the Genocide
Convention have a "normative and compelling" obligation to "take such
action as they can to prevent genocide from occurring . ,,26This inter-
pretation of the obligation to take action to prevent genocide from
occurring envisages something beyond the exercise of criminal jurisdic-
tion and punishment-something more akin to an international
responsibility to protect populations wherever they are situated. Accord-
ing to the Court, the obligation to prevent is not "limited by territory"
and applies "to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in
122. Jean Ping, Chairperson, African Union Comm'n, Keynote Address at the Round-Table
High-Level Meeting of Experts on 'The Responsibility to Protect in Africa' (Oct. 23, 2008),
available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil society-statements/l 910 (last
visited June 6, 2009).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 21 (2003).
126. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 427 (Feb. 26).
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ways appropriate to meeting the obligations in question."'' 27 In addition,
the Constitutive Act of the African Union treats the risk of international
crimes as jurisdictional triggers for regional intervention.' 28 However, it
is with the emergence of the responsibility to protect concept that we see
an institutionalization of this expanded role for international criminal
law categories in international governance. The risk of international
crimes taking place is now posited as the trigger to a broad range of gov-
ernance and police functions. The jurisdiction of the international
community will be triggered by the risk that certain specified crimes
may be committed.
As noted above, this trigger was introduced in an attempt to limit
what otherwise seemed to be an extraordinarily open-ended authoriza-
tion of international involvement to take responsibility for protection
wherever there was a perceived threat to populations or people. Yet the
terms in which international jurisdiction is formulated still envisage an
expansive role for the international community in policing the actions of
governments. The situation in which that international jurisdiction may
be triggered is spelled out most clearly in the context of military inter-
vention. The World Summit Outcome provides that where "national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations," "we"
(who this "we" refers to is not spelled out) "are prepared to take collec-
tive action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII." 29 In
relation to the other techniques of international protection envisaged in
the World Summit Outcome, it is far less clear when international juris-
diction will be triggered. For example, the World Summit Outcome
provides that "[t]he international community, through the United Na-
tions, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means.., to help to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against human-
ity.'' 30 This jurisdiction "to help to protect" appears to exist alongside
state jurisdiction without any specific trigger for action. Similarly, "[w]e
also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting
127. Id., 183.
128. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h) (setting out as one of the principles
of the Union "[t]he ight of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of
the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity.").
129. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 88, 139.
130. Id.
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those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break OUt."' 3'
That articulation of the responsibility to protect re-characterizes activi-
ties such as conflict prevention, surveillance, human rights monitoring
and development as part of a normative framework of international re-
sponsibilities. Yet it is not clear under what circumstances the
jurisdiction to help States build capacity and to assist "before crises and
conflicts break out" will be triggered.
C. The Encounter Between Jurisdictions
The World Summit Outcome thus envisages two forms of author-
ity-one in the form of the State and one in the form of the international
community. Both the State and the international community are repre-
sented as having an ongoing responsibility to protect populations from
specified crimes. The World Summit Outcome thus envisages the exis-
tence of complementary jurisdictions. The State has primary authority
for protection of its population, and the international community has
both a specific authority to take over the role of protector if the State
fails in its obligations and an ongoing authority to help protect popula-
tions through diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, and
through capacity-building "before crises and conflicts break out."'32
Where two authorities have overlapping jurisdiction, it would seem nec-
essary to provide for some means of determining which authority has
jurisdiction in a given situation. Yet the World Summit Outcome does not
elaborate how the encounter between these jurisdictions is to be negoti-
ated, or according to what protocols or procedures the movement
between jurisdictions will be conducted.'33 For instance, it is not clear
how, and by whom, the determination will be made that a particular
event or action constitutes a risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic clean-
sing or crimes against humanity. What kind of information or evidence
would be necessary before the international police could be called into
action?
In this respect, the World Summit Outcome can usefully be con-
trasted with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
which gives detailed treatment to the procedures for moving between
complementary forms of jurisdiction over very similar crimes. The
Rome Statute creates a regime in which the ICC operates in parallel to
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. For an analysis of the European tradition of international law as a source of proto-
cols for mediating the encounter between laws, see Anne Orford, Ritual, Mediation and the
International Laws of the South, 16 GRJFFITH L. Rev. 353 (2007). On the need for protocols
governing the encounter between jurisdictions, see Christine Black et. al, Of the South, 16
GRIFFITH L. REV. 299 (2007).
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national courts, both having jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or aggression. The
preamble to the Rome Statute provides that "it is the duty of every State
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for interna-
tional crimes. ''I 3 In many situations, the ICC will have jurisdiction over
the same crimes. The Rome Statute sets up a mechanism for the com-
plementary administration of criminal justice, or for the "distribution of
authority between national jurisdictions, on the one hand, and the juris-
diction of the International Criminal Court, on the other."'35 The basic
rule governing that distribution is that the ICC is authorized to intervene
"only when, but whenever the State primarily responsible for prosecu-
tion is not able or willing to genuinely investigate and prosecute."'136 In
addition, the Rome Statute contains detailed provisions dealing with "the
way in which this typically delicate question-whether a State has taken
serious action or not-is to be resolved."'3 7 The World Summit Outcome
lacks any such procedures for moving or negotiating between the com-
plementary jurisdictions of the State and the international community
when it comes to the exercise of the responsibility to protect.
D. The Nature of International Authority
Perhaps the lack of clarity about the limits of the international juris-
diction to protect in documents dealing with the responsibility to protect
is due to an implicit assumption about the nature of that jurisdiction. If
international jurisdiction were by its nature unable to conflict with state
jurisdiction, there would be no need to elaborate procedures for moving
between these forms of jurisdiction.
This would be the case, for example, if the international jurisdiction
envisaged by the responsibility to protect concept were understood as a
form of jurisdiction that mirrors the spiritual jurisdiction claimed by the
medieval papacy or the universal jurisdiction claimed by the Holy Ro-
man Emperor. The responsibility to protect concept does in some ways
seem to be a return to a world-view in which there exists "a single uni-
versal society functionally divided into spiritual and temporal spheres of
responsibility", 31 with the role of representative of spiritual authority
134. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an In-
ternational Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
135. Florian Jessberger, Universality, Complementarity, and the Duty to Prosecute
Crimes under International Law in Germany, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS CRIMES 213, 220 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. eds., 2007).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. MULDOON, supra note 16, at 66.
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played by the international community and that of temporal authority
played by the State. With this in mind, we might understand the emer-
gence of the responsibility to protect concept as signaling the
intensification of a non-territorial form of jurisdiction that applies to the
world as a whole. International jurisdiction understood in such terms,
and from the perspective of those claiming to represent the universal,
would necessarily take priority over merely particular authority.
The Pope reinforced that vision of the United Nations as an agent of
universal jurisdiction with responsibility for overseeing the conduct of
temporal authority in his address to the General Assembly in 2008.' 39 In
that address, the Pope embraced the responsibility to protect as a com-
mon project of the United Nations and the Catholic Church. He traced
the lineage of the responsibility to protect to Francisco de Vitoria, and
described the principle that those in government have a responsibility to
protect the governed as "an aspect of natural reason shared by all na-
tions," based upon "the idea of the person as image of the Creator
... .9 '40 In this view, the expression of the responsibility to protect insti-
tutes a form of spiritual jurisdiction, one premised not upon control over
territory, but upon the policing of the obligations and duties of responsi-
ble subjects. Here, the international community takes up the
responsibilities once claimed by the Pope of controlling princes and au-
thenticating obedient subjects. The authority of the international
community, like the Holy Roman Empire before it, derives from its di-
rect representation of the idea of justice, unmediated by the will of States
or governments. 4' The capacity to govern of the international commu-
nity, like the Holy Roman Empire before it, depends not upon its control
over territory, but upon the success of its officials (experts in human
rights, development economics, conflict studies, or genocide prevention)
in spreading the beliefs underlying Western legality throughout the
world. 
42
As it is not possible to return to a period prior to the emergence of
the modem territorial State, the new form of spiritual jurisdiction sig-
naled by the responsibility to protect would have to be able to achieve
redemption by moving the military machinery of powerful States into
action. And this is indeed the aim of coalitions such as the Save Darfur
139. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the General Assembly (Apr. 18, 2008) (transcript
available from The Vatican) available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedictxvi/
speeches/2008/april/documents/hf ben-xvi.spe_20080418_un-visit_en.html (last visited June
6, 2009).
140. Id.
141. See generally CARL SCHMITT, ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL FORM 30 (G.L.
Ulmen trans., 1996).
142. ALAIN SUPIOT, HOMO JURIDICUS: ESSAI SUR LA FONCTION ANTHROPOLOCIQUE DU
DROIT 18-20, 29-30 (2005).
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campaign-to persuade the United States, in particular, to move its mili-
tary into action in Darfur and elsewhere. The frustration expressed by
those members of civil society who understand themselves as playing
the role of the judges of States without the power to have their judg-
ments enforced suggests that this form of universal authority is not yet
realizable.
Alternatively, we might understand the turn to protection, together
with the centralized and integrated form of governance envisaged by the
proponents of the responsibility to protect, as indicating an ambition to
fashion the international community into something resembling a really
big State. If that were the case, there would be no need to provide for a
system to determine when a particular state jurisdiction gives way to in-
ternational jurisdiction, as territorial States would always have to answer
or defer to this newly empowered international community. Indeed, there
is a sense in which the turn to protection as the ground of authority, and
the linking of jurisdiction with the right to judge and punish, appears to
mirror the constitution of the modern State. Hobbes' argument that the
capacity to provide protection was the marker of legitimate authority
worked to discredit papal and imperial claims to de jure authority, as
well as populist arguments that authority should be grounded on an au-
thentic relation between governors and governed. His turn to protection
privileged de facto authority over appeals to popular sovereignty, the
ancient constitution, the will of the people, or the obligations of history.
Something similar is being staged with the turn to protection as the
ground of international authority today. The responsibility to protect
concept does not consider the legitimacy of authority in relation to a
third term-the people, the nation, the Volk. So whether or not the repre-
sentatives of the international community should, say, be present in Iraq
is not answerable in terms of the legitimacy of the initial acquisition of
control over that territory, or in terms of whether international authority
was constituted in accordance with the will of the people. The turn to
protection works to delegitimize appeals to those principles of territorial
integrity and self-determination that have been significant limiting fac-
tors to foreign rule.' 3
Of course, any attempt to transform the international community
into a world State would face the same problems that faced various em-
perors who aspired to turn the Holy Roman Empire into a big centralized
State. Such attempts were thwarted by "the scores of European king-
doms and other principalities that ... had created their own legal and
constitutional systems over a period of several centuries and were quite
143. Orford, supra note 49.
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unwilling to surrender them."'" Indeed, those who are charged with insti-
tutionalizing the responsibility to protect concept have been careful to
avoid any sense that the international community is seeking to supersede
state jurisdiction. As Edward Luck has commented:
For all the public pressures to advance RtoP principles, in the
end it was sovereign [S]tates that produced Article 4(h) of the
[African Union] Constitutive Act and paragraphs 138 and 139 of
the [World Summit] Outcome Document. It will take even closer
collaboration among States, international bodies, and civil soci-
ety to begin to realize the promise of RtoP1
45
It is more likely, then, that the responsibility to protect concept will
not radically alter the complex set of relations that exist between States
and the varied representatives of the international community. Contem-
porary international relations are characterized by the existence of many
overlapping jurisdictions with no accepted system for prioritizing be-
tween them. This situation is perhaps close to that which scholars now
argue existed in the territories claimed as part of the Holy Roman Em-
pire. New scholarship on the history of the Empire has challenged "the
orthodox view of imperial politics as a dualism between emperor and
princes.' ' 6 That scholarship argues that it is necessary to consider the
multiple components that made up the imperial political situation and
that produced a complex set of overlapping forms of jurisdiction and
competence. What was at stake then, as now, was how complementary
jurisdictions were to be negotiated, or how one law would encounter an-
other.
Indeed, the public international law of Europe emerged, in part, out
of this need to negotiate between forms of jurisdiction. As Christian
Europe fragmented into separate nation-states, mediation between es-
tranged nation-states became one of the key aims of the social practices
of war, commerce, law, and diplomacy that have since shaped the mod-
em state system. To take one example, norms and protocols governing
the movement, immunity, and privileges of diplomats were one of the
earliest forms of international law to develop in Europe.' 47 Ritual played
a central role in diplomatic culture, particularly during the early stages of
diplomacy when the modern sovereign State was still in formation.
Ceremonies and rituals relating to the movement of diplomats "sanc-
144. MULDOON, supra note 16, at 119.
145. Luck, supra note 46.
146. PETER H. WILSON, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 1495-1806, at 8 (1999).
147. See generally GARRETr MATTINGLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY (1988).
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tioned the movement across social and political boundaries."'48 The focus
on rituals and on the reciprocal exchange of letters, privileges, and obli-
gations contributed to creating the sense of a common culture of norms
and values in a Europe which could no longer rely upon a universal au-
thority (whether imperial or religious) to guarantee the law. 49 In this
sense, the international law of early modern Europe had an awareness of
its limits, which has perhaps been lost with the more universalist ambi-
tions of contemporary international law. If the relation between
international and state jurisdictions is to involve something other than
dominance and submission, some such attention must be paid to the pro-
cedures for moving or negotiating between the complementary
jurisdictions of the State and the international community.
IV. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY
As territory and jurisdiction became ever more closely intertwined
with the emergence of the modern State, questions about jurisdiction
increasingly came to be seen as purely technical questions. The practice
of jurisdiction is now understood simply to involve determining in what
circumstances a particular authority has power to declare the law in a
particular territory. Yet as we watch the way that power, territory, control,
and law shift and relate over time, we can see that jurisdiction is more
than a technical question. When a lawful authority articulates the terms
of its jurisdiction, it is forced to confront "in practice, the question of its
competence over a given case."'5° The process of claiming jurisdiction is
a form of alchemy. A successful claim of jurisdiction transforms power
into authority, or fact into right.
Precisely what new form of "international community" will emerge
from the process of transformation now taking place with the institution-
alization of the responsibility to protect concept is as yet unclear. There
is certainly little attention paid by those advocating the embrace of the
concept to the need to articulate the legal limits to the jurisdiction of
such an international protective authority. Most of the attention in inter-
nationalist literature to date has been on the ways in which the
responsibility to protect concept justifies the expansion of international
authority in situations where a State has failed to protect its population.
That literature is concerned with ensuring that in such cases, the interna-
tional community can be empowered to prevent, react and rebuild. The
148. JAMES DER DERIAN, ON DIPLOMACY: A GENEALOGY OF WESTERN ESTRANGEMENT
34(1987).
149. Id. at 36.
150. CORMACK, supra note 108, at 4.
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international community is portrayed as largely unlimited with respect to
the actions it can take to achieve its universal mission. 5 ' In terms of the
responsibility to prevent, the prospect of increased surveillance of for-
eign populations is welcomed as a contribution to realizing the promise
that never again will genocide be allowed to occur, rather than seen as a
threat to civil liberties or self-determination.' In terms of the responsi-
bility to react, activists have to date focused most of their energy on
arguing for military intervention or criminal prosecution, calling for de-
cisions about the use of force to be made quickly and for the largest
degree of force possible to be deployed.'53 In terms of the responsibility
to rebuild, the situation seems to resemble that of the 1990s, when the
effect of post-conflict governance in the aftermath of international inter-
ventions was to diminish the potential for parliamentary participation
and expand the potential for executive governance in the name of achiev-
ing social and economic integration. 54 Humanitarian intervention was
routinely followed by the creation and legitimization of strong interna-
tional administrations, marked by an apparent distrust of local
parliamentary democracy, an absence of constraints on international ex-
ecutive decisions, and the prioritization of economic liberalization as a
policy goal.' The ICISS report continues to treat international admini-
stration as a technical project concerned with "protection tasks,"'56 such
as security sector reform, the facilitation of repatriation, "the recreation
151. See Behrani v. France, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 85 (2007); Saramati v. France, Germany &
Norway, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 85, 121 (2007) (holding that operations established by Security
Council resolutions, such as that conducted in Kosovo, are "fundamental to the mission of the
[United Nations] to secure international peace and security" and that to subject the actions
carried out under U.N. authority to the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights would
"interfere with the fulfillment of the [United Nations'] key mission in this field including, as
argued by certain parties, with the effective conduct of its operations."). For a discussion of
these admissibility decisions, see Anne Orford, The Passions of Protection: Sovereign Author-
ity and Humanitarian War, in CONTEMPORARY STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE POLITICS OF
MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS (Didier Fassin & Mariella Pandolfi eds.,
forthcoming 2009).
152. At a major conference on The Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Confront-
ing Identity-Based Atrocities held at Cardozo Law School on March 10-11, 2008, the panel of
invited speakers on "Preventing Identity-Based Atrocities" included not only the Director of
the Program in Holocaust and Human Rights Studies at Cardozo Law School and the Program
Director of Human Rights Watch, but also a Professor Emerita at the U.S. Naval Academy,
who provided a detailed insight into the way in which the widespread U.S. counter-insurgency
surveillance conducted in foreign States could be understood as a form of conflict, and thus,
genocide prevention.
153. For a critique of this tendency, see Alex de Waal, Darfur and the Failure of the
Responsibility to Protect, 83 INT'L AFF. 1039 (2007).
154. ORFORD, supra note 82, at 126-43.
155. Id.
156. ICISS, supra note 4, at 65.
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of markets," and the "pursuit of war criminals."'' 7 It is to the question of
the limits of the jurisdiction of such an expansive international authority
that the responsibility to protect literature must turn if the absolutist ten-
dencies of the turn to protection and the privileging of de facto authority
are to be avoided.
A focus upon the articulation of jurisdiction can help indicate what is
at stake in this process. The attempt to give institutional expression to the
concept of the responsibility to protect through articulating the triggers
to international jurisdiction necessarily gives rise to questions about the
nature, limits, and ends of international authority. The processes of de-
bating, defining, and delimiting jurisdiction allow us to see the work
involved in transforming an ideal like protection into institutional prac-
tice, and in transforming a conventional basis for the exercise of power
into a universal claim to authority. Legal institutions are places where
arguments for the legitimacy of authority are made conventional and
public, and where official language goes to work to institute a collective
opinion about power. Conventional or public representations of authority
matter because authority, in order to be lasting, must be recognized as
legitimate by rivals and subjects. Authority, in order to be profitable,
must be recognized as legitimate by investors. Those who exercise inter-
national protective authority in a given territory must therefore be able to
articulate that authority in terms of jurisdiction, if they are to be able to
undertake the tasks necessary to governing (or protecting) effectively.
Whether we think of this new form of international authority as a big
State, a new Holy Roman Empire, or a more chastened authority negoti-
ating competencies with the territorial State, it is in the articulation of its
jurisdiction that the question of the limits and ends of international au-
thority will have to be addressed.
157. Id. at 42, 66.
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